shirleymckie.myfastforum.org

Big Wullie · Joined: 25 Apr 2007 Posts: 456 Location: Glasgow

My Case for Review.

Having been granted Legal Aid to take Review of SCCRC my case now goes into second gear, First hurdle over.
Secondly i would just like to take this chance and link a decision of the High Court in the Raymond Gilmour trial.
This is important now to my appeal as at [36] it reads:
[36] On the question of the standard of proof, the trial judge said:

"The standard of proof is beyond reasonable doubt; that is to say, that no jury can find an accused guilty of any crime unless they are satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of that guilt. Now, reasonable doubt just means what it says: it means a real doubt in your minds; not an insubstantial or fanciful doubt. I usually put it this way - I don't know whether it is helpful or not - that for a verdict of guilt you need not be absolutely certain of guilt - and I emphasise not absolutely certain - but you must be reasonably certain, because if you are not reasonably certain, you have a reasonable doubt. So bear in mind, ladies and gentlemen, that if I use phrases in my address to you such as "The Crown must prove" or "You must be satisfied" or "Are you satisfied," all these phrases are subject to the implied qualification "beyond reasonable doubt" (pp 4-5).

The Court agreed that this was a Misdirection at [122] it reads:
The misdirection ground

[122] This point was not taken at the original appeal. I am not surprised. In those days judges varied in their formulations of the idea of reasonable doubt. The direction in this case was not uncommon. The direction was, however, inaccurate; and the advocate depute has conceded that it was a misdirection, for the reasons given in A(CW) v HM Adv (2003 SCCR 154).

This statement by the Judge was one of my grounds to SCCRC who told me it was not a "Misdirection" and can be found at the following:
http://www.flickr.com/photo_zoom.gne?id=1393862612&size=l
At Number [12] Clearly SCCRC have misdirected Themselves.

I am amazed to find that Mr Gilmour Had the same Judge, sameYear, and complained of the same Misdirection.

I have also enlisted the Help of an Identifcation Expert whom i claim SCCRC should have consulted When investigating my grounds.

I am now looking forward to getting my day in court.

Wullie beck

PeterCherbi · Joined: 23 May 2007 Posts: 116 Location: Edinburgh

Good luck Wullie.

It's about time too you got your day in court and had this cleared - and those held to account who need to be over what happened to you.
_________________
My blog on issues of injustice in Scotland A Diary of Injustice in Scotland by Peter Cherbi

Injustice Scotland Campaign website : Injustice Scotland

Iain McKie · Joined: 08 May 2007 Posts: 170 Location: Ayr, Scotland.

Amen to that Peter.

Wullie Beck, his wife Louise and his family have remained steadfast over 25 years of pain and uncertainly hoping that one day someone would listen to their pleas.

Now at last someone is and while the battle is far from over their faith and courage in the face of an uncaring justice system is an inspiration to all of those who for one reason or another have been denied justice.

*Angel* · Joined: 30 May 2007 Posts: 47

Good luck Wullie.

Annies family, relatives and us friends think of you and your family!

"We hope and pray that justice finally will be seen and done"

And as Iain wrote;

"The battle is far from over for some of us"

And as AL wrote;

"We all certainly hope so and that the Scottish authorities, those i have repeatedly criticised over their very shabby handling of this very tragic case, and their apparent uncaring treatment of Annie's family and friends, will now start to take this case (and others highlighted on this forum) much more seriously"

SO LETS HOPE THEY WILL NOW START TO TAKE ALL THE CASES MUCH MORE SERIOUSLY!!!!!!!!!

" THERE IS HOPE IN THE AIR TODAY "

*AngeL*

Big Wullie · Joined: 25 Apr 2007 Posts: 456 Location: Glasgow

Peter, Iain, and Angel

Thanks to you all for your words of encouragement, Although more confident than i have been for many years i am aware of the incestuous nature of the Legal Profession to protect their interests, I have also had so many doors shut in my face over the years i dare not become over confident.
My Judicial review of SCCRC is likely to be asking some of the following questions.
1. Why did they Not ask the solicitor Why he never interviewed 16 defence witnesses before my Trial.
2. Why wont they answer me when in three letters i said my defence team were guilty of not calling Crucial Forensic Evidence.
3. Why they agreed that what happened at my ID Parade was not what one would expect today, But then refused to apply their current Law Policy.
4. Why they agreed the Judge Misdirected my Jury but then said: But it would only take "Half An hour" to travel from Livingston to Glasgow. When this was not an Issue. The car was chased from Livingston to Newbridge then seen being abandoned in Kirkliston. So it never went from Livingston to Glasgow.
They also never done any test nor asked for any expert opinions on these timings.
5. Why they allowed a witness to say i went to his door and threatened him, When clearly i was in prison at the time. This witness was referred to by the Commission as credible and reliable despite this Huge Discrepancy. There was no redress from this the SCCRC accepted his word as Gospel.
Is this the actions one would expect of an Independent and Robust investigation they claim to give every case?
6. When SCCRC were given the names of the two robbers the very least they should have done would have been to Interview them, But because they had already referred the case of Neeson and one of the robbers was put forward by the Commission as a Credible and reliable witness in the Neeson case, I was simply told it would be unlikely they would now admit their Guilt.
.
Over the course of this review i intend to keep everyone who has supported me informed of the progress
Watch this space

Big Wullie · Joined: 25 Apr 2007 Posts: 456 Location: Glasgow

Judicial Review Of SCCRC

Having read the following: http://www.scotcourts.gov.uk/opinions/2007csoh152.html

I am now of the opinion that no matter what grounds are presented to the court in my own case the outcome will be the same as above.
In my view our courts are allowing SCCRC to pick and choose what cases they want to.
They are allowing SCCRC to get away with "Murder"

Even though there are arguable grounds the appeal courts are saying our Politicians have not Legislated properly.

This is despite the SCCRC having a duty and professing to give every case an Independent, Robust and Impartial review (Who is kidding who here)

They are also saying SCCRC will not be held accountable for their actions even if they are wrong, I have said for a long time that SCCRC are answerable to No-One and this decision confirms this for me.

how can they say that SCCRC can be allowed not to refer a case, if there are already similar appeals that have been won on the same principals and grounds?

Everyone is entitled to an appeal or at least to have their grounds put before a sift panel.

SCCRC are also being allowed to not fully investigate grounds of appeal on the same principals (There has been no Miscarriage of Justice) This is all they have to say it would appear.

Maybe i should try an application to the Nobile Officium instead of a Judicial Review

Here is some other stuff from my Wordpress page concerning this Judicial Review
http://williambeck.wordpress.com/.../likely-judicial-review-of-sccrc/

Big Wullie · Joined: 25 Apr 2007 Posts: 456 Location: Glasgow

In Short

Advocate Sheads Argument:

It was submitted that if the Commission finds arguable grounds for an appeal, then it is clear that a miscarriage of justice must have occurred. In short, the only test that the Commission should consider is whether it is possible that there has been a miscarriage of justice. If there are arguable grounds for an appeal, then the answer to that question must be yes. In the present case, the only relevant question was: is it arguable that the sentence was too long? For the various reasons set out in the petition and the material put before the Commission, Mr Shead submitted that the obvious answer to this question is yes, especially if the arguments are considered cumulatively.

SCCRC Response: [4] In reply Mr Moynihan, Q.C.,
The Commission can decline to refer even if there are arguable grounds for a miscarriage of justice.

However the Commission operates under a very different statutory regime, and thus there is no good reason to equiparate the Commission's task with that of the sifting judges. The role of the Commission is to be viewed in the context of the finality provisions in section 124(2) of the Act. It exists to deal with cases where there are good grounds for believing that there may have been a miscarriage of justice.

Further, the Commission was simply echoing the views already expressed by three experienced sifting judges.

Recognition that there are arguable grounds for leave to appeal is a different thing from belief that a miscarriage of justice may have occurred.

If Parliament had intended the Commission to apply the same test as the sifting judges, it could have said so in clear terms.

I Submit
Are the Appeal Courts saying it is Parliaments Fault? YES
Should the Commission be allowed to merely just Echo views? NO
We must ask our Politicians to have this changed "Urgently" Hear Hear
Should any Judge who finds relevant grounds of appeal not automatically allow such to proceed, This was my understanding of the Duty Bestowed Upon Our Judges.

full terms of sections 194B and 194C indicate that the Commission's remit is a discretionary one. This can be contrasted with that given to the sifting judges, who have no discretion to refuse leave to appeal if there are arguable grounds of appeal. I agree with Mr Moynihan's submission that this is inconsistent with the submission that the Commission's task should be equiparated with that of the sifting judges.

I Submit
The Commidssion portray themselves as a truth seeking Body and profess to give every case an: Independent, Impartial and Robust Investigation, Clearly this is not the case with my own Application to SCCRC.
The above should ensure every case be treated the same, for example, If a case is referred say on the principal that Crown refused to reveal Key material (As In the cases of Kidd, Gair, Allison and Johnston Referred by SCCRC and Successful at Appeal) then surely all other cases coming before them with the same ground must also be referred.
Failure on behalf of SCCRC to refer one and not the other can and will always be seen as Being "Biased"
Should they be allowed to pick and choose which ones with the same grounds are Referred, I think not.

Other criticisms of the Commission's decision

Mr Moynihan reminded me that this is a judicial review, and the court must not seek to substitute any views of its own for those of the Commission.

I Submit
Is it therefore a waste of time anyone asking our courts to Judicially review SCCRC if they have no intention of ever substituting their views against the SCCRCs ?
What is the whole point of the Judicial review in the first place ?
This whole case and opinion makes our Justice system the biggest Laughing stock in the world and puts justice out of Reach.

[11] I should also record that Mr Shead presented a brief argument which, as I understood it, was to the effect that his approach to section 194C of the Act and his criticisms of the respondent's decision should be accepted, because otherwise there would be a breach of the petitioner's right to a fair determination of the criminal charge under article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). This was on the basis that the petitioner has been denied the opportunity to present arguable grounds of appeal.

Decision
and that had the Commission's decision been quashed, the court cannot pre-judge the outcome of its reconsideration of the matter.

I would have preferred Mr Moynihan's submissions to the general effect that the sheriff had sufficient information before him to permit such a sentence, not least the report from Dr Linda Graham.

I Submit

The work of my Advocate will be cut out for him at my own Judicial review, Though my case is similar there are some differences.
My case has never been before a sift panel.
I have never had an appeal.
I was refused legal aid for appeal in 1982
SCCRC did not interview my witnesses
SCCRC did not afford me an Impartial review (They allowed Mr Taylor to still sit on their commission whilst they investigated my complaints of him) Rather they did not investigate my complaints, For this i now blame Parliament for not making it clear to them they must abide by the same rules of our Appeal Courts, At the very least one would expect them to operate on the same principals.
Please Pause for a minute here and think;
If you have the best Grounds in the Country, SCCRC can still refuse to refer your case thus allowing them to act as Judge and Jury, therefore tresspassing on the Court as the final Arbiter.

SCCRC Can And Will Do As They Please And You Have No Redress

http://www.scotcourts.gov.uk/opinionsApp/supreme.asp

Big Wullie · Joined: 25 Apr 2007 Posts: 456 Location: Glasgow

Found something else SCCRC should have taken into account when investigating my grounds of appeal.

[edit] Devlin Report 1976
Cases that led up to the establishment of the Devlin Committee on evidence of identification in criminal cases 1976:

Beck’s Case: One of the most notorious English cases was that of Alfred Beck, who was picked out in identification parades by 12 women, served seven years and then was released. As the offences continued he was again picked out by four women in a line-up, was convicted and was awaiting sentence when the real culprit was finally apprehended. Beck’s case lead to the establishment of the English Court of Criminal Appeal in 1908.

Slater’s Case: Another notorious case was that of Oscar Slater who served 18 years for murder owing to a wrong identification. Two persons identified Slater as the man leaving the house after a murder, and 12 others identified him as having earlier kept watch on a house, but only after witnesses had seen him in custody before identifying him. Slater’s case led to the establishment of the Scottish counterpart of the Court of Criminal Appeal in 1926.

Dougherty’s Case: In 1972 Luke Dougherty was charged with shoplifting after two witnesses independently picked out his photograph from a police album and identified him as one of team of shoplifters. He was also identified in the dock during the trial. Although he had an alibi, and no trace of either accomplice was found, Dougherty was convicted and sentenced to 15 months imprisonment. The sentence was affirmed on appeal. Whilst serving his sentence, Dougherty’s case was taken up by ‘Justice’, an association of lawyers concerned with the fair administration of justice. Acting on a submission from Justice the Home Secretary, exercised his power to refer the case to the Court of Appeal for further consideration. The Court ordered Dougherty’s immediate release on bail, and ultimately quashed his conviction.

Virag’s Case: In 1969 Laszlo Virag was charged with thieving from parking meter coin boxes, using a fire arm to resist arrest and wounding a police officer with intent to cause grievous bodily harm. Of 14 witnesses, eight identified Virag in a line-up; five of these eight were police officers. Three witnesses picked out someone else and the remaining three made no identification. Identification evidence was the only evidence led against him. One police officer testified in court that ‘his face is stamped on my memory’. Although Virag had an alibi, did not drive a car—the culprit had been involved in a car chase with police—and smoked a brand of cigarettes different from the brand smoked by the culprit, he was convicted and sentenced to ten years in prison. Whilst Virag was in prison, a second man was arrested and charged with thieving from parking meters. Further investigations indicated that it was he who had committed the earlier offences. Virag received a pardon. As a result of the wrongful convictions of Dougherty and Virag the Devlin Committee on evidence of identification in criminal cases was established.

Metropolitan Police Officer: In one case where a member of the Metropolitan police attempted to intercede for a neighbour of unblemished character who was charged by the City of London Police on implausible identification evidence, the result was that he himself was put on parade, wrongly identified and immediately suspended from duty as being under suspicion of being concerned with the same offence.

Professor Glanville Williams, when commenting on the Devlin Report on English identification procedures noted that:

Neither the Beck case at the turn of the century nor the many miscarriages of justice since then have sufficiently impressed those concerned with criminal justice of the dangers of identification evidence. To mention some of the instances in late years: three occurred alone in the space of a few months in 1967-68. A memorandum of the National Council of Civil Liberties published in 1968 gave details of 15 cases from 1966 onwards; in most of these a person was convicted on identification evidence and the mistake was either established or very likely; in a few of them the defendant had not gone beyond being committed for trial when by a happy accident the mistake was discovered. A memorandum later in the same year from Justice instanced another six cases and others have occurred since. In all of them the mistake came to light in some fortuitous way as by the real offender coming forward and confessing.

Australian Law Reform Commission

BBC News Reported The aftermath of the shooting of Jean Charles de Menezes at Stockwell Tube station has shown that eyewitness testimony may not always be as reliable as it seems.

Andrew Roberts, a lecturer in law at Leeds University specialising in evidence, said courts have recognised for a long time that eyewitness identification evidence is "inherently unreliable". Two cases helped change the view in British courts, he said. In 1969, Laszlo Virag was convicted of stealing from parking meters and using a firearm while trying to escape police officers. Despite his alibi and other contradictions, he was identified by eight witnesses as the man who committed the crime. While he was in prison it was found another person had committed the crime and he was pardoned.

In 1972, Luke Dougherty was convicted of shoplifting after two witnesses picked his face out of a police album. He was eventually cleared and both cases led to the Devlin Committee's investigation of identification evidence, which found that many witnesses overstated their ability to single out the right person.

And More.

Turnbull guidelines
Regina -v- Turnbull and Others WLR [1976] 3 WLR 445

It wasn’t until the case of: R v Turnbull 1976, 63 Cr App R 132; [1977] QB 224 (CA) that the Court of Appeal laid down guidelines on how the jury should be directed in relation to disputed eye-witness identification evidence. When directing the jury, the judge is required to tailor the Turnbull guidelines to the facts of the particular case.

LORD WIDGERY C.J.:Each of these appeals raises problems relating to evidence of visual identification in criminal cases. Such evidence can bring about miscarriages of justice and has done so in a few cases in recent years. The number of such cases, although small compared with the number in which evidence of visual identification is known to be satisfactory, necessitates steps being taken by the courts, including this court, to reduce that number as far as is possible. In our Judgment the danger of miscarriages of justice occurring can be much reduced if trial judge’s sum up to juries in the way indicated in this judgment.

First, whenever the case against an accused depends wholly or substantially on the correctness of one or more identifications of the accused which the defence alleges to be mistaken, the judge should warn the jury or the special need for caution before convicting the accused in reliance on the correctness of the identification or identifications. In addition he should instruct them as to the reason for the need for such a warning and should make some reference to the possibility that a mistaken witness can be a convincing one and that a number of such witnesses can all be mistaken. Provided this is done in clear terms the judge need not use any particular form of words.

Secondly, the judge should direct the jury to examine closely the circumstances in which the identification by each witness came to be made.

How long did the witness have the accused under observation?
At what distance?
In what light? Was the observation impeded in any way, as for example by passing traffic or a press of people?
Had the witness ever seen the accused before?
How often?
If only occasionally, had he any special reason for remembering the accused?
How long elapsed between the original observation and the subsequent identification to the police?
Was there any material discrepancy between the description of the accused given to the police by the witness when first seen by them and his actual appearance?
If in any case, whether it is being dealt with summarily or on indictment, the prosecution have reason to believe that there is such a material discrepancy they should supply the accused or his legal advisers with particulars of the description the police were first given.

In all cases if the accused asks to be given particulars of such descriptions, the prosecution should supply them. Finally, he should remind the jury of any specific weaknesses which had appeared in the identification evidence.

Recognition may be more reliable than identification of a stranger; but even when the witness is purporting to recognise someone whom he knows, the jury should be reminded that mistakes in recognition of close relatives and friends are sometimes made.

All these matters go to the quality of the identification evidence. If the quality is good and remains good at the close of the accused's case, the danger of a mistaken identification is lessened; but the poorer the quality, the greater the danger.

In our judgment when the quality is good, as for example when the identification is made after a long period of observation, or in satisfactory conditions by a relative, a neighbour, a close friend, a workmate and the like, the jury can safely be left to assess the value of the identifying evidence even though there is no other evidence to support it: provided always, however, that an adequate warning has been given about the special need for caution. Were the courts to adjudge otherwise, affronts to justice would frequently occur. A few examples, taken over the whole spectrum of criminal activity, will illustrate what the effects upon the maintenance of law and order would be if any law were enacted that no person could be convicted on evidence of visual identification alone.

Here are the examples. A had been kidnapped and held to ransom over many days. His captor stayed with him all the time. At last he was released but he did not know the identity of his kidnapper nor where he had been kept. Months later the police arrested X for robbery and as a result of what they had been told by an informer they suspected him of the kidnapping. They had no other evidence. They arranged for A to attend an identity parade. He picked out X without hesitation. At X's trial, is the trial judge to rule at the end of the prosecution's case that X must be acquitted?

This is another example. Over a period of a week two police officers, B and C, kept observation in turn on a house which was suspected of being a distribution centre for drugs. A suspected supplier, Y, visited it from time to time. On the last day of the observation B saw Y enter the house. He at once signalled to other waiting police officers, who had a search warrant to enter. They did so; but by the time they got in, Y had escaped by a back window. Six months later C saw Y in the street and arrested him. Y at once alleged that C had mistaken him for someone else. At an identity parade he was picked out by B. Would it really be right and in the interests of justice for a judge to direct Y's acquittal at the end of the prosecution's case?

A rule such as the one under consideration would gravely impede the police in their work and would make the conviction of street offenders such as pickpockets, car thieves and the disorderly very difficult. But it would not only be the police who might be aggrieved by such a rule. Take the case of a factory worker, D, who during the course of his work went to the locker room to get something from his jacket which he had forgotten. As he went in he saw a workmate, Z, whom he had known for years and who worked nearby him in the same shop, standing by D's open locker with his hand inside. He hailed the thief by name. Z turned round and faced D; he dropped D's wallet on the floor and ran out of the locker room by another door. D reported what he had seen to his chargehand. When the chargehand went to find Z, he saw him walking towards his machine. Z alleged that D had been mistaken. A directed acquittal might well be greatly resented not only by D but by many others in the same shop.

When, in the judgment of the trial judge, the quality of the identifying evidence is poor, as for example when it depends solely on a fleeting glance or on a longer observation made in difficult conditions, the situation is very different. The judge should then withdraw the case from the jury and direct an acquittal unless there is other evidence which goes to support the correctness of the identification. This may be corroboration in the sense lawyers use that word; but it need not be so if its effect is to make the jury sure that there has been no mistaken identification: for example, X sees the accused snatch a woman's handbag; he gets only a fleeting glance of the thief's face as he runs off but he does see him entering a nearby house. Later he picks out the accused on an identity parade. If there was no more evidence than this, the poor quality of the identification would require the judge to withdraw the case from the jury; but this would not be so if there was evidence that the house into which the accused was alleged by X to have run was his father's. Another example of supporting evidence not amounting to corroboration in a technical sense is to be found in Reg. v. Long (1973) 57 Cr.App.R. 871. The accused, who was charged with robbery, had been identified by three witnesses in different places on different occasions but each had only a momentary opportunity for observation. Immediately after the robbery the accused had left his home and could not be found by the police. When later he was seen by them he claimed to know who had done the robbery and offered to help to find the robbers. At his trial he put forward an alibi which the jury rejected. It was an odd coincidence that the witnesses should have identified a man who had behaved in this Way. In our judgment odd coincidences can, if unexplained, be supporting evidence.

The trial judge should identify to the jury the evidence which he adjudges is capable of supporting the evidence of identification. If there is any evidence or circumstances which the jury might think was supporting when it did not have this quality, the judge should say so. A jury, for example, might think that support for identification evidence could be found in the fact that the accused had not given evidence before them. An accused's absence from the witness box cannot provide evidence of anything and the judge should tell the jury so. But he would be entitled to tell them that when assessing the quality of the identification evidence they could take into consideration the fact that it was uncontradicted by any evidence coming from the accused himself.

Care should be taken by the judge when directing the jury about the support for an identification which may be derived from the fact that they have rejected an alibi. False alibis may be put forward for many reasons: an accused, for example, who has only his own truthful evidence to rely on may stupidly fabricate an alibi and get lying witnesses to support it out of fear that his own evidence will not be enough. Further, alibi witnesses can make genuine mistakes about dates and occasions like any other witnesses can. It is only when the jury is satisfied that the sole reason for the fabrication was to deceive them and there is no other explanation for its being put forward can fabrication provide any support for identification evidence. The jury should be reminded that proving the accused has told lies about where he was at the material time does not by itself prove that he was where the identifying witness says he was.

In setting out these guidelines for trial judges, which involve only changes of practice, not law, we have tried to follow the recommendations set out in the Report which Lord Devlin's Committee made to the Secretary of State for the Home Department in April 1976. We have not followed that report in using the phrase "exceptional circumstances" to describe situations in which the risk of mistaken identification is reduced. In our judgment the use of such a phrase is likely to result in the build up of case law as to what circumstances can properly be described as exceptional and what cannot. Case law of this kind is likely to be a fetter on the administration of justice when so much depends upon the quality of the evidence in each case. Quality is what matters in the end. In many cases the exceptional circumstances to which the report refers will provide evidence of good quality, but they may not: the converse is also true. A failure to follow these guidelines is likely to result in a conviction being quashed and will do so if in the judgment of this court on all the evidence the verdict is either unsatisfactory or unsafe.

Big Wullie · Joined: 25 Apr 2007 Posts: 456 Location: Glasgow

Identification Evidence, How Reliable.

Given the likes of the devlin and Thomson reports etc etc and that people are still being wrongly convicted Solely on Identification eveidence, I think it worthwhile to link the following sites.
Not only does it show that a very high percentage of wrongful convictions are attributed to Wrongful Identifications but it shows our Courts have been aware of it for years.
I feel the need here to say that Professor Valentine has done a report on my own case and is willing to help in Miscarriages.
He has also i believe done one for Wullie Gage and Barry George

http://www.valentinemoore.co.uk/

http://www.valentinemoore.co.uk/research.htm

http://www.goldsmiths.ac.uk/psychology/staff/valentine.php

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/4177082.stm

http://www.innocenceproject.org/u.../Eyewitness-Misidentification.php

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Devlin_committee

http://www.hrothgar.co.uk/WebCases/pc/reports/00/37.htm

http://www.wikicrimeline.co.uk/in...Visual_identification_of_suspects

Some of these reports go back to 1976 which would mean when i was wrongly convicted our courts were fully aware of the possible Miscarriages with convictions resting solely on Identifications.

The above links could also help people like Wullie Gage who was, in my opinion, Set-Up the same as myself, but his conviction rested on only one person Identifying him, The victims wife.
Now she was supposed to have seen out her window for hundreds of yards i think with her lights on in her house and with the suspect wearing a scarf over his face, What a joke.